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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EVAN GARTH WESTENSKOW, ) 
Plaint i f f-Appel lant , : 
v s . ) Case No. 14436 
GLORA WESTENSKOW, : 
Defendant-Respondent . ) 
REBUTTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT O F THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a divorce act ion. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was t r i ed to the cour t without a j u ry . The Dis t r ic t Court 
awarded Glora Westenskow the divorce and in the dec ree provided for auto-
mat ic i n c r e a s e s in al imony and support money payments , and in addition 
divided the m a r i t a l es ta te by giving approximately 85% to Glora Westenskow 
with only 15% to Evan Westenskow. 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Evan Westenskow seeks on th is appeal: 
(a) A modification of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s Decree of Divorce e l iminat ing 
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in Paragraph 6 the automatic increases in alimony payments with both parties 
being left to avail themselves of relief contemplated by Section 30-3-5, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), and 
(b) A modification of the tr ial court 's Decree of Divorce eliminating 
the automatic increases in child support payments leaving the parties to avail 
themselves of relief contemplated by Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), and 
(c) A modification of the tr ial court !s Decree of Divorce to provide 
for an equitable property division of 50% to each party. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Evan Westenskow, the Plaintiff and Appellant, will hereinafter 
be referred to as the Appellant, the Plaintiff,or, where appropriate, by 
his name. Glora Westenskow, the Defendant and Respondent, will herein-
after be referred to as the Respondent, the Defendant, o r , where appropriate, 
by her name. 
MRM is a reference to a page in the record of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Evan Westenskow, has already 
set forth a Statement of Facts in his initial brief. The Respondent, in her 
* 
brief, has also set forth a Statement of Facts . Inuendos and inferences 
in the Respondent's Statement of Facts (which may or may not have some 
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bearing on the case) prompt the following supplemental statement on 
the part of the Appellant: 
A. Respondent, on page 3 of her brief, indicates that the Appellant 
intentionally terminated his employment with Burroughs Corporation about 
two months prior to t r ia l . The fact is that the divorce action had nothing 
to do with Appellant's termination at Burroughs (R.121). The Appellant 
indicated in his initial Brief that he had often discussed with Glora 
Westenskow his desire to become self-employed and have his own 
business (R. 121). His plans had been to work for a good company for 
a short period of time after graduation from college to gain some 
experience and then to try to get into business for himself (R. 121). The 
opportunity for self-employment came in July, and he had to exercise 
the option and take advantage of that opportunity (R.121). The marital 
difficulties experienced by the parties prior to the termination of Appellant's 
employment precluded the Appellant from obtaining a better opportunity 
with Burroughs (R. 121 & 122). He doubted that he would be given other 
and further opportunity with the company (R. 122), and therefore took 
advantage of the self-employment business opportunity when it arose (R. 122). 
B. Also, on pages 3 and 4 of her brief, Respondent states: "Two 
weeks prior to the tr ial of this mat ter , Appellant purchased a 1976 
Pontiac Grand Prix and testified that the purchase of this new car would 
affect his ability to pay alimony and child support during the next five years . , f 
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Here are the facts Respondent failed to mention: It was critical for 
Appellant to have good transportation in his business (R. 134). Appellants 
business required that he travel every day (R.124). The geographic area 
in which he must travel includes Utah and most of Idaho (R. 124). 
Appellants previous car broke down three times in one week (R. 134 & 
160). Appellant was faced with a repair bill on his old car of approximately 
$800.00 (R. 135). Since an automobile was absolutely necessary for the 
business that Appellant was engaged in, the Appellant decided, upon the 
advice of a mechanic and Appellant's father (R. 168), who was the major 
investor in Appellant's new company (R. 134), that it would be best in the 
long run to get rid of the old car (R. 134) and get a new car (R. 168). 
C. On page 5 of her brief, Respondent suggests that the Appellant 
valued his one-sixth interst in 390 acres in Wayne County at $200-$300 
per acre . In real i ty, Appellant could not give an accurate appraisal of 
the value of the Wayne County property interest . When asked if he had any 
idea of the fair market value of the property in question, Appellant replied, 
MI really don't. M Appellant then ventured a guess as to the value of the 
property (R.150). Subsequently, the Appellant testified: MI have no idea 
of the value. M (R.151). 
D. Also on page 5 of her brief, Respondent characterized appellant 's 
one-sixth interest in 390 acres in Wayne County as a vested interest . The 
interest is properly characterized as an expectancy or an inheritance 
outside of the marital estate (R.152). The deed reciting Appellant's interest 
- 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is unrecorded and its purpose is simply to expedite the handling of the 
Grandmother's estate and avoid a future probate proceeding* Counsel for 
Respondent conceded: !,We are not claiming any interest in the property, 
Your Honor, as far as this inheritance. We're not taking the position that 
we want any of the proper ty ." (R. 153). The land subject to the deed is the 
means of support for Appellant's Grandmother and Appellant receives no 
income from the land as a result of the deed. Appellant has nothing to do 
with the property (R. 167). 
E. On page 5 of her brief, Respondent states that the Appellant was 
awarded all of the gifts of stock transferred to the Appellant from his 
Grandmother. This was proper as the stock was incident to Appellant's 
inher i tance of the one-sixth interest of acreage in Wayne County, Utah". 
(R. 92). That stock is not a part of the marital estate. With respect to 
oth^r stock, however, the Respondent was awarded ffone-half of the stock 
of the parties11. (R. 93). 
F . On page 3 of her brief, the Respondent states that Appellant's 
new business started generating income in September of 1975. The evidence, 
however, shows that the Appellant made no income during September, which 
month was the start-up period for his new corporation (Exhibit E and R. 135). 
G. On page 3 of her brief, the Respondent states: "Two new vans 
were leased to transport machines to be sold and to be used by Appellant 
and one employee {R, 170). " Tha Appellant testified: "When this business 
was started, Your Honor, there were two of us that were working full-time, 
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and another one went to par t - t ime. There were three principals in the 
corporation. I would not have leased both of the vans had it have been my 
business (R.170). The company, with other principals involved, chose to 
lease the new vans because that was all they could obtain (R. 170). 
H. On page 6 of her brief, Respondent states: ''Appellant was 
further ordered to pay any indebtedness owing to his grandmother, if any 
there be (R.95 and Ex.B). , f Appellant's Grandmother did make a loan of 
$5,000 to Appellant and Respondent and it is a bona fide obligation owed 
to her (R. 129 and 130). There is an urgent necessity for payment of that 
loan because Appellant's Grandmother is presently in greater need of the 
money than she has been in the past (R. 130). 
I. On page 4 of her brief, Respondent indicates that the value of 
the home at the time of t r ial was between $36,000 and $38,000. The 
Appellant testified that the value of the home was $41,000 (R. 153). 
J . Grounds for divorce are not in issue on this appeal. Never-
theless , counsel for the Respondent on page 3 of his brief, refers to 
certain information in the record in an effort to create the inference that 
another woman was involved. What really broke up the marriage--which 
is not an issue on this appeal--was fully delineated by Evan Westenskow 
in his direct testimony, if it is of any interest to this Court (R. 114 - 118). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PROVIDING 
FOR AUTOMATIC INCREASES IN ALIMONY PAYMENTS AND 
AUTOMATIC INCREASES IN CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
The Appellant rea f f i rms his position in his init ial brief that 
t he r e was no b a s i s whatsoever for the t r i a l cour t to provide automatic in-
c r e a s e s in al imony and child suppor t . The Respondent has cited no 
evidence justifying automatic i n c r e a s e s ; indeed, no such evidence could be 
c i ted . Outside of Evan WestenskowTs opt imis t ic project ion of what he 
hoped his net income would be over the subsequent t h ree month per iod 
[ R . 1 3 5 , 136; P l a i n t i f s Exhibit E (Appendix, page 28)] , t he re is no 
evidence whatsoever r ega rd ing e i ther Evan Westenskow ! s o r the R e s p o n d e n t s 
future financial c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Automatic i n c r e a s e s based solely on Evan Westenskow ?s p resen t 
income a re as a rb i t r a ry as i n c r e a s e s based solely on the passage of t i m e . 
Support for each child was init ial ly set at $75 pe r month. With r e spec t 
to a l imony, the t r i a l cour t awarded $75.00 pe r month to Respondent . 
These amounts w e r e , of c o u r s e , based on the financial c i r cums tances 
of the pa r t i e s at the t ime of t r i a l . Child support should have been left 
at that figure with the pa r t i e s having r e s o r t to the court under the provis ions 
of Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953) in the event of changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
- 8 -
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The Respondent, on page 12 of her brief, suggests "options1' 
available to the court with respect to setting child support and alimony, 
but at the same time concedes the propriety of setting child support and 
alimony at an initial figure subject to the Court !s continuing jurisdiction 
to consider changed circumstances. Respondent then urges , on page 12 of 
her brief, that "there is another option available, i . e . the option of 
providing increases in alimony and child support based upon increases 
in the income of the Appellant." In this case , however, there is absolutely 
no evidence that there will even be any increase in income let alone what 
any such increase would be. In addition, there is no evidence showing what 
Evan Westenskowfs future financial picture would be, including obligations 
and liabilities,even if there is an increase in his income. 
The two cases cited by Respondent--In the Matter of the Dissolution 
of the Marriage of Patricia Ann Tyerman, 534 P . 2d 998 (Ore. App 1975) and 
Berg v. Berg, 434 P . 2d 1 (Wash. 1967)--do not support Respondents 
position. Both cases are clearly distinguishable. They are not precedents 
for allowing automatic increases based solely on the passage of time and/or 
increased income without considering all other aspects of the payor's 
financial position. 
In Tyerman (cited by Respondent on page 12 of her brief) the 
Court did not provide for automatic increases in alimony. On the contrary, 
the t r i a l court had ordered an automatic alimony decrease after ten years 
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where the husband, a medical doctor, withdrew from private practice 
during the dissolution of the marriage and entered the military service 
as a Major. On appeal, the husband argued that in two yea r s , when his 
take-home pay would drop from $1,750 per month to approximately $1,500 
per month, it would be impossible for him to pay to his children and wife 
the support awarded by the tr ial court. In response, the Oregon Court 
of Appeals stated: 
We think the evidence is too indefinite to be assured what 
husband1 s income will be after two years in the service. 
If what counsel asser ts proves to be so , an adjustment prob-
ably should be made in two years in the amount of the wifefs 
support. The indefiniteness of the evidence appears to reflect 
as much an inability to determine what the husband?s pay will 
be in two years as it does a failure to produce available evi-
dence. Hence a determination of what the payments should 
be then may be determined by future unpredictable events. 
. . . if the husband1 s income drops as his counsel forcasts it 
will in two yea r s , that will be a change of circumstances which 
will then justify a reappraisal of the amount of support for 
the wife if proper motion is made therefor. 
534 P . 2d at 1000. Accordingly, no automatic two year adjustment was 
allowed and the parties were left with the opportunity of a future judicial 
reappraisal of the matter in the light of any changed circumstances. 
In Berg (cited by the Respondent on page 13 of her brief) the 
Washington Supreme Court approved an automatic decrease in alimony. 
No automatic increase was involved. There is an essential conceptual 
difference between awarding alimony and support with automatic increases 
based on income and providing for automatic decreases . In providing for 
-10-
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a decrease in the amount of alimony to be paid the tr ial court, in essence, 
is curtailing the right to alimony. The tr ial court is awarding alimony 
based on the husband's then existing financial circumstances and then 
diminishing the right to alimony over a period of time (or terminating 
the right altogether) based on those same existing circumstances. The 
underlying policy is expressed in the following language of the Court fs 
opinion in Berg: 
'Alimony is not a matter of right. When the wife has the 
ability to earn a living it is not the policy of the law of this 
state to give her a perpetual lien on her divorced husband's 
future income [Citations omitted]. 
1
 The criterion adopted by this court for the allowance of alimony 
includes two factors: (1) the necessities of the wife, and 
(2) the financial ability of the husband [Citations omitted]. 
. . . It is not the purpose of the law to place a permanent 
responsibility upon a divorced spouse to support a former 
wife indefinitely. She is likewise under an obligation to 
prepare herself so that she might become self-supporting. 
The allowance of alimony is to provide such an interval for her 
reasonable preparation. 
434 P.2d at 2 -3 . 
Now in the instant case where the tr ial court provided for an 
automatic increase in alimony (as opposed to a situation where there 
would be an automatic decrease), not only is a continued entitlement 
to alimony being recognized, but the amount to be paid is being increased 
with only one consideration: the passage of t ime. Financial realit ies are 
not even considered. 
It is significant to note in Tyerman that with an income of $1,750.00 
per month the husband was only required to pay $150 per month for the 
_ i 1 
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support of each of the minor children. Here is what the Trial Court 
saddled Evan Westenskow with: 
a. Alimony at the rate of $75 per month for a period 
of six months and thereafter at the rate of $100 per month 
for a period of six months and thereafter to $150 per month 
for a period of four years; and, 
b . a child support obligation in the sum of $75 per month 
per child for a period of three months after which it would 
increase to $125 per month per child and remain at that 
level until Evan's income reached $15,000 per year at which 
time it would raise to $150 per month per child and if and when 
his income reaches $18,000 per year the child support 
will be at $180 per month per child. 
- -a l l with a projected income of only $680 per month with no evidence 
whatsoever of any potential increase and if any increase does occur the 
increased alimony and support obligations would be effective without 
considering any other aspect of his financial position other than his income. 
With no judicial prededent for automatic increases the Respondent, 
on page 13 of her Brief, refers to what is described as a "common practice 
among attorneys to provide for various levels of alimony and child 
support as they relate to fluctuations in the husband1 s earnings level11. 
There is no basis whatsoever for that statement and to the extent there 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is any such willingness on the part of an attorney to work out a varying 
level of alimony and child support, he would never--if he is in his right 
mind--undertake to saddle a client with alimony increases without solid 
assurance of what the total future financial picture would be. 
In this case , the Court must come to grips with a problem that 
has far-ranging consequences: Should the t r ial court without evidence 
of future financial circumstances be permitted to provide for automatic 
increases in alimony and/or child support based solely on the passage 
of time and/or income increase , or should the Court set an initial 
support and alimony award based on financial circumstances prevailing 
open 
at the time of the t r ia l and leave/the possibility of future appraisal and 
adjustments pursuant to Section 30-3-5 in the light of all future financial 
circumstances? If this Court approves the tr ial court 's decision in the 
instant case a precedent is going to be set giving the "green lightn to 
t r ia l courts to provide for automatic increases for years to come and 
for adjustments upward based on simply the passage of time or income, 
all of which opens the door to abuses and financial burdens from which 
a husband and father could get little relief. In effect the obvious purpose 
of Section 30-3-5 will have been nullified. The obvious solution, where 
alimony and support are proper , is to require the tr ial court to make a 
present alimony and support award in the light of then existing circumstances 
and leave future determinations to proper reappraisals under Section 30-3-5 
in the light of all existing circumstances. 
-13-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE RESPONDENT APPROXIMATELY 
85% OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WITH ONLY 15% 
GOING TO EVAN WESTENSKOW 
With r e spec t to the division of p rope r ty in a divorce ac t ion , it i s 
recognized that t he re is no ha rd and fast r u l e . However , the recen t 
decision of this Court in McKean v s . McKean, 544 P . 2d 1238 (Utah 1975) 
(cited by the Respondent on page 8 of he r brief) u n d e r s c o r e s and affirms 
the widespread t rend of recent y e a r s in the vast major i ty of divorce act ions 
to divide p rope r ty ndown the middle" - -50% to each pa r ty . 
In Leftwich v s . Leftwich, 549 P . 2d 447 (Utah 1976) (cited by the 
Respondent on page 8 of her brief) this Court affirmed a decision of the 
t r i a l court wherein the t r i a l court re jec ted a 1/3 (to the wife)- -2/3( to the 
husband) formula urged by counsel for the husband. The decision of the 
t r i a l c o u r t , which was affirmed by th is Court on appea l , was consis tent 
with McKean v s . McKean. 
Nei ther McKean nor Leftwich support anything like the 85% (to the wife) - -
15% (to the husband) p rope r ty division which was imposed by the t r i a l court 
in the instant c a s e . 
Judge Hyde 's r e sponse to the Appel lant ' s r eques t for a division ndown 
- 1 4 -
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the middle'1, (R.201) that "it overlooks the interest of these children" (R.201), is 
simply unrealistic and untrue. An equitable division of the property on a 
50%—50% basis could easily have been accomplished with the Respondent 
being permitted to continue to occupy the home with the children in her care 
and custody and with the Appellant being given a more appropriate lien. 
A 50%—50% division of the property would have resulted in no harm whatso-
ever to the children. The matter of property division, as long as the children 
are provided suitable living accomodations, is a matter involving the husband 
and wife. The Appellant proposed a property division (see Exhibit " F " of 
the Appendix to the Appellant's initial Brief) which would have involved the 
sale of the home, it being his view that the home payments were too much of 
a burden for either party and that apartment quarters could have been better 
handled. There is no problem, however, with respect to an equitable 50%— 
50% division with the home going to the Respondent as was awarded by Judge 
Hyde. Certainly with the Respondent being granted the home and the custody 
of the children, the children will be taken care of in the home. There will 
be support money payments for the benefit of the children. All that would 
have been required to effect an equitable 50%—50% division of property 
without any harm to the children whatsoever would have been to increase the 
amount of the Appellant's lien from $5,000. 00 to $11, 541. 72 and to provide 
for an appropriate time of payment. Such is done many times a day on the 
tr ial court level in cases that never reach this Court. 
With respect to the matter of the division of property, 
-15- . 
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• • . it is not necessary for this court 
to find a gross abuse of discretion on the 
part of the tr ial court before modifying 
the judgment as to alimony . . . 
See Hendriks vs . Hendriks, 91 Utah 553, 
63 P . 2d 277, 279 (1936). 
Presumably such would also be true with respect to child support and marital 
property. 
On page 15 of her brief, the Respondent denies the Appellant's con-
tention that the Respondent was awarded "everything she asked for'1 citing 
the prayer of her Complaint. It is conceded that if "everything she asked 
for" was equitable there would be no reason to deny what was granted simply 
because it was asked for, but granting the Respondent "everything she asked 
for" in this case simply dramatizes the inequity and abuse of discretion that 
occurred. The Appellant urged the tr ial court to divide their small estate 
"down the middle". The Respondent, in the prayer of her Counterclaim, 
had demanded an even more exorbitant portion of the property than was asked 
for in argument at the conclusion of the t r ia l . At the conclusion of the t r ia l , 
the Respondent's demand and suggested division was less than had been 
prayed for in the Complaint, though grossly unfair (see Respondent's Exhibit 
No. 5), aid it was the Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 that was followed verbatim 
by the t r ial court in a Memorandum Decision more than two weeks after the 
case was heard (R. 63, 66)--even to the inclusion of a "debt" for which there 
is no evidence in the record whatsoever. Compare Exhibit 5 with the 
Memorandum Decision (R. 66). There is no evidence in the record whatsoever 
-16-
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of any debt owing the Bank of Utah. It is obvious that the tr ial judge, some 
two weeks after the tr ial of the case , simply referred to the Respondent's 
proposal (Exhibit 5) and granted the Respondent everything she requested--
whether all of the items were in the estate or not. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It was an abuse of discretion for the tr ial court to provide for automatic 
increases in alimony and support money payments as was done and to award 
the Respondent approximately 85% of the property of the par t ies . Alimony 
and support money should have been left at the levels initially established--
$75.00 per month alimony to the Respondent and $75.00 per month for the 
benefit of each child by way of support. The interests of the children would 
not have been jeopardized in any respect with an equitable property division. 
All the tr ial court needed to do was to increase the amount of the Appellant's 
lien and provide for an appropriate payment thereof. 
The decree of the tr ial court should be modified eliminating from 
paragraph 6 the escalated alimony payments and eliminating from paragraph 7 
the escalated child support payments. Fur thermore, the decree of the tr ial 
court should be modified to provide for a 50%--50% division. This could 
easily be accomplished, with no resulting harm whatsoever to the children or 
to Mrs . Westenskow, by simply providing for an increase in the amount of 
the lien in paragraph 3 of the Decree from $5,000.00 to $11,541.72. If the 
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decis ion of the t r i a l cour t in this case i s not modified, we will have a d i sas t rous 
p receden t in the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submit ted , 
McKAY, BURTON, McMURRAY & THURMAN 
leys to r ±L,van 
Plaintiff- Appellant 
Westenskow 
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Richard H. Thornley of F r o e r e r , Horowitz , P a r k e r , Thornley & Critchlow 
at 2610 Washington Boulevard , Ogden, Utah, At torneys for Defendant-
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